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Motor imagery and perception – considered generally as forms of motor simulation – share overlapping
neural representations with motor production. While much research has focused on the extent of this
“common coding,” less attention has been paid to how these overlapping representations interact. How
do imagined, observed, or produced actions inﬂuence one another, and how do we maintain control over
our perception and behavior? In the ﬁrst part of this review we describe interactions between motor
production and motor simulation, and explore apparent regulatory mechanisms that balance these
processes. Next, we consider the somatosensory system. Numerous studies now support a “sensory
mirror system” comprised of neural representations activated by either afferent sensation or vicarious
sensation. In the second part of this review we summarize evidence for shared representations of sen-
sation and sensory simulation (including imagery and observed sensation), and suggest that similar
interactions and regulation of simulation occur in the somatosensory domain as in the motor domain.
We suggest that both motor and somatosensory simulations are ﬂexibly regulated to support simulations
congruent with our sensorimotor experience and goals and suppress or separate the inﬂuence of those
that are not. These regulatory mechanisms are frequently revealed by cases of brain injury but can also be
employed to facilitate sensorimotor rehabilitation.
Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Contents
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In the nearly two decades since the discovery of mirror neurons
in monkeys (Gallese et al., 1996), much research has explored the
extent of “common coding” between action and action perception.
Further research has explored the degree to which mirror neurons
– or at least “mirror mechanisms” – are necessary or sufﬁcient for
higher-level abilities like action comprehension, mentalizing, and
empathy (e.g. Sinigaglia, 2013; Iacoboni, 2009). Other implications
of these shared representations, however, have received less at-
tention. Schütz-Bosbach and Prinz (2007) astutely point out that in
addition to motor resonance – the inﬂuence of perceived action on
the motor system (e.g. Rizzolatti et al., 2001) – common coding
also implies perceptual resonance – an inﬂuence of action on ac-
tion perception. In other words, by virtue of overlapping neural
representation, activation of motor representations by “real” mo-
tor production and “simulated” motor activity exert mutual in-
ﬂuence on each other. This overlap between observed, imagined,
and produced movements raises the question of how we maintain
control over our perception and behavior. In the ﬁrst half of this
paper we review interactions between motor production, ob-
served movement, and imagined movement, and explore how
their interaction is regulated.
The motor system, of course, is not the only system that con-
tends with vicarious and imagined representations. Arguably each
sensory domain must carefully regulate the inﬂuence of imagined
sensations, observed sensations, and other forms of vicarious
sensation. The somatosensory system, however, works in espe-
cially close consort with the motor system, and several authors
have argued for the existence of a somatosensory mirror system
(e.g. Bradshaw and Mattingley, 2001; Fitzgibbon et al., 2012)
containing overlapping representations of sensation, observed
sensation, and somatosensory imagery. We thus constrain our
current discussion to the motor and somatosensory domains. As in
the motor system, overlapping neural representations in the so-
matosensory system imply mutual interaction between afferent
sensation and vicarious or imagined sensation. In the second half
of this paper we review evidence of such interactions and of their
regulation.
Observed and imagined somatosensory and motor activity can
be considered together as forms of simulation. Simulation is
commonly invoked to describe a variety of cognitive processes
from automatic motor resonance to conscious reasoning about the
goals and intentions of others (for a discussion of varying theories
of simulation in social cognition, see Decety and Grèzes, 2006). In
the current review, we do not utilize this term in order to endorse
simulation accounts of action understanding (e.g., the idea that
observed action automatically activates matching motor re-
presentations in the viewer that afford understanding of the ob-
served action; Gallese and Goldman, 1998). Simulation here is
considered generally as an activation of neural representations of
movements that are not produced overtly, or sensations that are
not caused by external somatosensory stimulation (similar to
Decety and Grèzes, 2006). To the extent that observed and ima-
gined movements and sensations activate representations sharedwith efferent movements and afferent sensations, we can consider
them simulations of the corresponding “real” sensorimotor state
they emulate. Regardless of whether these simulations are drawn
upon by additional cognitive processes, these activations inﬂuence
our perception and action.
We suggest that interactions between simulated and “real”
sensorimotor processes occur in both the sensory and motor do-
mains. In addition, we argue that numerous neural processes
ﬂexibly regulate the inﬂuence of simulation on action and per-
ception. This ﬂexible regulation supports simulations that are
congruent with one's experiences and goals and suppresses or
separates the inﬂuence of those that are not. In particular, we ar-
gue that simulation is regulated by sensorimotor feedback, frontal
and transcallosal inhibitory processes, and calculations of self-
identiﬁcation and social afﬁliation. Throughout, we rely on cases of
brain damage and deafferentation to explore the role of speciﬁc
brain areas in regulation of simulation. Deafferentation removes
motor capacity and motor feedback as well as afferent sensation,
allowing us to see the role that sensorimotor feedback normally
plays in simulation. Similarly, brain lesions allow for study of the
role of a particular brain area in regulating simulation. Cases of
brain damage to sensory and motor regions, also provide an op-
portunity to capitalize on shared representations and use simu-
lated motor and sensory activity to support sensorimotor re-
habilitation. These examples further demonstrate the dynamic
interactions between simulated and “real” sensorimotor activity.2. The motor system
2.1. Motor referral
2.1.1. Overlapping representations of action and action perception
When we observe others move, we simulate their actions in
our motor system (e.g. Jeannerod, 1994; Grèzes and Decety, 2001;
Rizzolatti et al., 2001). We use the term ‘motor referral' to describe
this covert, spontaneous mirroring of others.2 Behavioral, func-
tional brain imaging, and transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS)
studies have accumulated evidence of brain areas with mirror
properties in humans: areas active during both the performance
and observation of a given action (e.g. Fadiga et al., 1995; Alt-
schuler et al., 1997; Cochin et al., 1999; Muthukumaraswamy and
Singh, 2008; Keysers and Gazzola, 2009; Ushioda et al., 2012).
Individual subjects consistently activate shared voxels during
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) of observed and
performed movements (Keysers and Gazzola, 2009). fMRI adap-
tation studies have obtained mixed results (e.g. Chong et al., 2008
versus Lingnau et al., 2009), but single-cell recordings in surgical
patients have provided direct evidence of neurons that respond to
both observation and execution of actions (Mukamel et al., 2010).
In addition, studies of primary motor cortex (M1) excitability
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ipheral muscles involved in the observed movement (Fadiga et al.,
1995; Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2002; Maeda et al., 2002; Strafella and
Paus, 2000; Hari et al., 2014).
2.1.2. Interactions between action and action perception
An implication of common coding in the human mirror system
is that movements we observe might inﬂuence movements we
produce. Indeed, a number of studies evidence the inﬂuence of
observed actions on produced actions. Similar action representa-
tions appear to facilitate one another. Observing ﬁnger move-
ments, for example, increases force production of ﬁnger move-
ments (Porro et al., 2007). Participants are faster to perform ﬁnger
movements congruent with those they observe (Brass et al., 2001a,
2001b), and faster to perform a grasping action when shown a
hand position similar to the target (Craighero et al., 2002). Con-
versely, action production affects action perception, as Schütz-
Bosbach and Prinz (2007) argue. Moving a body part facilitates
recognition of that body part's position on another person (Reed
and Farah 1995), and rotating a knob biases perceived apparent
motion in the same direction (Wohlschläger, 2000). Hand actions
facilitate visual discrimination of congruent hand postures (Miall
et al., 2006).
Actions and observed actions that are dissimilar from one an-
other, however, often exhibit interference effects. When an ob-
served action is incongruent with motor planning it can slow
down motor response (e.g. Brass et al., 2000), perturb the path of
movement in space (Kilner et al., 2003), or increase the observer's
body-sway (Tia et al., 2011). Similarly, movements can alter the
perception of discrepant actions. Walking at a different speed than
an observed model impairs an actor's estimation of the model's
walking speed (Jacobs and Shiffrar, 2005), wearing ankle weights
lowers an actor's estimate of how high an unencumbered person
can jump (Ramenzoni et al., 2008), and biting a pencil or tongue
depressor (to block simulation-related motor action in the mouth)
interferes with recognition of happy faces (Oberman et al., 2007a,
2007b) and visual perception of speech (Turner et al., 2014). Fi-
nally, preparing for a particular movement interferes with re-
sponse time to imitate an incongruent movement – more so than
an unrelated distracter (Obhi and Hogeveen, 2013). Motor referral
is also sensitive to timing. Even when asked to not synchronize
with one another, two people performing rhythmic actions tend to
entrain to each other's rhythm (Marsh et al., 2009). These studies
suggest that motor referral and motor production facilitate or in-
terfere with one another depending on the spatiotemporal and
postural congruence of the observed and performed actions.
2.1.3. Processes that regulate motor referral
The interactions between motor referral and motor production
suggest that these processes mutually depend on – and constrain –
each other. Indeed, evidence from phantom limb patients suggests
that motor activity may normally inhibit motor referral. Amputees
lack the ability to produce motor movements in their absent limb.
Yet when their healthy arm is visually superimposed in a mirror
onto their phantom arm, amputees frequently report that the
phantom arm feels like it is moving (Ramachandran and Hirstein,
1998). This motor referral is exploited in mirror box therapy, an
effective method of pain reduction for many patients with painful
phantom limbs (Ramachandran et al., 1995; Ramachandran and
Rogers-Ramachandran, 1996; Chan et al., 2007). Mirror box ther-
apy demonstrates that motor referral can occur in the absence of
concurrent motor feedback. Indeed both healthy individuals and
individuals with non-painful phantom limbs show activation of
M1 and primary sensory cortex (S1) during mirror box motor re-
ferral (Diers et al., 2010). The patients with non-painful phantom
limbs actually showed greater activation of M1 than the controlsubjects did. This suggests that motor activity may normally in-
hibit simulation of observed actions.
In contrast, reductions in motor production after botox injec-
tion suggest that motor feedback normally facilitates simulation.
Reducing muscular feedback from the face with botox impairs
perception of facial expression (Neal and Chartrand, 2011) and
reduces emotional response in the amygdala (Hennenlotter et al.,
2009), while enhancing muscular feedback from the face enhances
perception of facial affect (Neal and Chartrand, 2011). This suggests
that motor feedback from the face normally enhances motor re-
ferral, improving emotional simulation. In line with this, in-
dividuals following instructions to suppress their own facial ex-
pressions are less sensitive to the facial affect of others, while
mimicking others' expressions improves sensitivity to others' af-
fect (Schneider et al., 2013). Why do amputation and botox have
different effects on motor referral? It may be that simulation is
inhibited by default in the limbs – important for locomotion – but
not in the face, where simulation provides more help than harm.
Motor referral may also be regulated by the frontal lobes. Since
spontaneous, overt imitation of actions is uncommon, it has been
suggested that the frontal lobes tonically inhibits imitation. Brass
et al. (2001a, 2001b) performed fMRI while subjects executed pre-
instructed ﬁnger movements in response to an observed ﬁnger
movement that was either congruent or incongruent with the
performed movement. On incongruent trials, there was strong
activation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, right frontopolar
cortex, right anterior parietal cortex, and precuneus, suggesting
prefrontal involvement in response inhibition of imitative actions.
Indeed, damage to the prefrontal lobes seems to disrupt frontal
lobe suppression of mirror areas, causing Echopraxia, a condition
in which patients indiscriminately imitate the movements they
observe (Brass et al., 2003, 2005). Echopraxia can also arise as a
result of basal ganglia dysfunction or injury (Rizzolatti et al., 2009),
implicating cortico-limbic circuitry in the regulation of motor ac-
tivity. In addition, automatic mirroring can be suppressed by at-
tention, context, and task goals (for a summary, see Cross and Ia-
coboni, 2014).
Brass et al. (2005) also found that suppression of an imitative
response involved the right tempero-parietal junction. The right
inferior parietal cortex is involved in distinguishing imitating from
being imitated (Decety et al., 2002), and the right temporo-parietal
junction plays a role in perspective taking and judgments of self-
agency (Brass and Heyes, 2005). The involvement of these brain
areas suggests that judgments of self and other may contribute to
regulation of the inﬂuence of observed actions on action produc-
tion. This idea is supported by work showing diminished sensor-
imotor referral to observation of pain in racial out-group members
(Avenanti et al., 2010). Referral was not diminished to unfamiliar
“out-group” violet-colored hands, however, suggesting inhibition
related to higher-level identity constructs.
Brain areas involved in social cognition may work in consort
with the frontal lobes to select simulations that are congruent
with an agent's goals. For example, early motor system resonance
is lower while preparing to counter-imitate than to imitate (Cross
and Iacoboni, 2014), can be modulated by likeability of the actor
(Sobhani et al., 2012), and is reduced when the participant is
treated unfairly by the actor (Aragón et al., 2013). Nonconscious
mimicry is heightened when the subject desires to desires social
connection or rapport, suggesting that social goals modulate si-
mulation (Lakin and Chartrand, 2003; Aragón et al., 2013). Fur-
thermore, movement–congruency effects are moderated by whe-
ther the actor and observer share the same action intention, de-
monstrating a layered control mechanism over action simulation
(Ondobaka et al., 2012). The supplementary motor area (SMA) may
also provide such control; within the population of mirror neurons
in the SMA, a subpopulation of neurons respond with excitation
L.K. Case et al. / Neuropsychologia 79 (2015) 233–245236during action and inhibition during action observation (Mukamel
et al., 2010).
2.2. Motor Imagery
2.2.1. Overlapping representations of motor actions and imagery
Our understanding of motor imagery follows the widely ac-
cepted description of Richardson (1969): “the quasi-sensory and
quasi-perceptual experiences of which we are self consciously
aware and which exist for us in the absence of those stimulus
conditions that are known to produce their genuine sensory or
perceptual counterparts…” Motor imagery is thus the subjective
experience of quasi-movement, in the absence of corresponding
overt movement (though small muscle activations may occur).
Motor imagery activates brain areas similar to those used in motor
production (for a review, see Jeannerod and Frak, 1999; Oosterhof
et al., 2012), including primary motor (Porro et al., 1996; Roth
et al., 1996), premotor, and parietal regions, and the supplemen-
tary motor area and cerebellum (Stephan et al., 1995; Decety et al.,
1994; Filimon et al., 2007; Gerardin et al., 2010). Some studies
have observed a greater response to motor imagery than to motor
production in the bilateral premotor, prefrontal, and supplemen-
tary motor areas, left posterior parietal cortex, and the caudate
nuclei (Gerardin et al., 2010), as well as the right superior posterior
parietal lobe (Harris and Miniussi, 2003). Motor imagery also ex-
hibits somatotopy (Ehrsson et al., 2003; Lorey et al., 2013). A direct
effect of motor imagery on motor production is evidenced by in-
creased corticospinal excitability of motor neurons in response to
imagined movements (e.g. Fourkas et al., 2006; Li, 2007; Bakker
et al., 2008; Liepert and Neveling, 2009) and by the disruptive
effect of TMS over the motor cortex on mental rotation tasks (e.g.
Ganis et al., 2000).
2.2.2. Interactions between action and motor imagery
The interaction between motor feedback and motor imagery is
frequently demonstrated through the mental rotation paradigm
(Shepard and Metzler, 1971). Multiple studies in which subjects
mentally rotate two drawings have found that response times
increase monotonically with the angle of discrepancy between the
two images (Petit et al., 2003), suggesting that subjects use motor
imagery to simulate rotating the images. Similarly, Parsons
showed that reaction time correlates with ease of movement from
the participant's current position to the position of the pictured
hand (Parsons, 1994, 1987). This effect of body position on mental
rotation has been shown to be effector-speciﬁc (Ionta et al., 2007),
demonstrating that the inﬂuence of motor activity on motor
imagery depends on the congruence between motor state and
motor imagery. Study participants have been unable to learn new
motor movements solely through motor imagery (Mulder et al.,
2004), however, suggesting that motor imagery is dependent upon
existing motor representations.
Motor imagery can facilitate motor production. For example,
motor imagery has been used to improve strength, speed of action,
range of motion, and posture in healthy individuals and athletes,
as well as skilled actions in nursing and surgery (Dicksten and
Deutsch, 2007). Motor imagery has also been shown to aid in re-
habilitation of motor movement in patients suffering or recovering
from stroke, spinal cord injury, and Parkinson's disease (Zimmer-
mann-Schlatter, 2008; Oh et al., 2010; Tamir et al., 2007; Dickstein
and Deutsch, 2007). Repeated motor imagery practice increases
motor-related activation of premotor, primary motor, and superior
parietal regions in stroke patients (Page et al., 2009a). In a patient
with profound hemiplegia, daily motor imagery practice led to
cortical reorganization, including increased activity in parietal,
motor, and SMA areas contralateral to the paralyzed limb (John-
son-Frey, 2004). Motor imagery can interfere, however, withproduction of incongruent movements. Hall et al. (1995) had
participants practice a simple motor task and then practice an
interfering movement–either overtly, or through imagery alone.
Imagined and overt practice with the conﬂicting movement pro-
duced similar degrees of interference with retention of the original
motor pattern, suggesting strong similarity in the processing of
sensorimotor production and imagery.
Motor imagery also appears to be affected by the anticipated
sensory consequences of an imagined movement. The forward
model of motor control posits that efference copies of motor
commands are sent to the parietal lobes and are used to generate
predicted sensory feedback from the planned action (e.g. Wolpert
and Miall, 1996). Comparison between the predicted sensory
feedback and actual sensory feedback is used to ﬁne-tune move-
ments (e.g. Wolpert, 1997). Indeed, Coslett et al. (2010) report that
patients with chronic shoulder or arm pain conditions are slower
than controls to judge the laterality of hand drawings when the
implied motor imagery involved painful amplitudes of rotation.
This suggests that the parietal cortex regulates motor imagery
through simulation of the anticipated sensory consequences of an
imagined movement.
2.2.3. Processes that regulate motor imagery
To learn about the regulation of motor imagery, it is again
useful to consider what happens to motor imagery when motor
production is disabled. Silva et al. (2011) studied mental rotation in
patients with temporarily anesthetized arms. The patients per-
formed poorly, but improved greatly when allowed to observe
their anesthetized arm. This suggests that feedback from the
peripheral motor system plays an important role in motor ima-
gery, perhaps by providing information about limb position. It also
suggests that visual information can supply important informa-
tion, which may explain why motor referral (with its visual input)
is less affected by deaffaerentation. Permanent deafferentation
shows a similar effect. Nico et al. (2004) found that upper limb
amputees (the majority of whom reported phantom sensations)
were impaired on an upper limb mental rotation task, but showed
a similar response pattern to that of control subjects: showed
slower response times, and more errors for anatomically difﬁcult
postures. Interestingly, wearing a static prosthesis interfered with
motor imagery much more than a functional prosthesis. This
suggests that the motor affordances of a functional prosthesis may
be incorporated into a patient's body schema. These studies sug-
gest some dependence of motor imagery on motor and visual
feedback, as motor imagery may be constrained when motor and
visual feedback are unavailable.
In some patients with deafferentation, however, motor imagery
is well preserved. Using fMRI, Ersland et al. (1996) found that a
patient with a phantom right arm activated contralateral motor
cortex in response to mental imagery of ﬁnger tapping of the
phantom. Single neuron recordings performed in amputees during
imagined movements of the phantom showed similar activation of
neurons in the cerebellum, basal ganglia, and ventral caudal so-
matic sensory nucleus to control patients imagining arm move-
ment. This activation may relate to planning movements and their
predicted sensory consequences (Anderson et al., 2010). Indeed,
Lotze et al. (2001) found that patients with a phantom limb
showed signiﬁcantly higher motor and sensory activation than
controls during motor imagery. Most of the patients also reported
a subjective feeling of movement in their phantom limb. Lotze
et al. attribute this ﬁnding to the high level attention paid by pa-
tients to pain and sensation in their phantom arm. Another pos-
sibility, however, is that motor imagery, like motor referral, is
stronger in the absence of motor feedback. This suggests a tonic
suppression of motor imagery by motor feedback.
In sum, deafferentation appears to have a deleterious effect on
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patients with phantom limbs. Several factors may be involved in
these divergent outcomes. First, the phantom limb patients stu-
died by Lotze et al. (2001) had been amputated for a mean of 17.3
years, while the amputees studied by Nico et al., had been am-
putated for a mean of only about 5.5 years. There may have been
differences in the mobility of the phantom limbs in each study, as
well as in the degree of difﬁculty of the motor tasks. Finally, while
Nico's task required implicit simulation, Lotze's demanded explicit
simulation. Rafﬁn et al. (2012) has shown that attempting to make
“real” versus “imagined” movements of phantom limbs results in
different neural activations, similar to the differing activations
observed in response to real versus imagined movements of intact
hands. Rafﬁn et al. also showed, however, that imagery for phan-
tom limbs and intact limbs produced similar levels of brain acti-
vation. Given these mixed ﬁndings, we suggest that strong motor
imagery depends on intact central motor representation of a
movement, but not on online motor feedback. We also suggest
that it requires a representation of limb position that is compatible
with the imagined movement.
Another way to look at interactions between motor production
and motor imagery is to examine cases of central motor damage.
Johnson et al. (2002) investigated motor imagery in patients who
had suffered cerebral vascular incidents damaging motor ability
but sparing parietal and frontal areas involved in motor simula-
tion. Compared to recovered controls, the patients were unim-
paired on imagery involving the affected limb. Unexpectedly,
however, the patients performed more accurately in their hemi-
plegic limb. Johnson et al. suggest that this 'hemiplegic advantage'
may be related to increased motor planning effort in the im-
mobilized limb. Another possibility, however, is that in the ab-
sence of motor feedback from the limb, imagery might be
strengthened. How can the hemiplegic advantage (Johnson et al.,
2002) be reconciled with the inferior performance of healthy in-
dividuals with anesthetized arms on mental rotation (Silva et al.,
2011)? One possibility is that hemiplegia may disrupt proprio-
ceptive monitoring – eliminating conﬂict with the motor imagery
– while patients with anesthetized limbs might maintain pro-
prioceptive representations of the arm prior to the procedure that
would conﬂict with imagined movements. Indeed, many patients
undergoing brachial plexus blocks experience a static “phantom
arm” (e.g. Gentili et al., 2002). Motor feedback may thus inhibit
incongruent motor imagery. When motor feedback is reduced,
motor imagery may be enhanced, unless the motor system clings
to a sensorimotor memory of limb position that is in conﬂict with
the imagined movement. Motor damage that reduces proprio-
ceptive monitoring may remove this impediment, strengthening
motor imagery.
Conversely, several groups have suggested that motor imagery
inhibits motor production (e.g. Lotze et al., 1999, Decety, 1996,
Jeannerod, 1994). Deiber et al. (1998) report that when partici-
pants moved their ﬁnger activity increased in primary motor areas
and decreased in the inferior frontal cortex compared to when
they imagined watching their ﬁnger move. The authors therefore
propose that the inferior frontal cortex plays a role in suppression
of motor production during motor imagery. Parietal areas may also
suppress production of imagined movements. Schwoebel et al.
(2002) report that a bilateral parietal lesion patient, CW, unwit-
tingly executed left-handed motor movements that he imagined.
Schwoebel et al. suggest the CW's parietal damage interfered with
a parietal lobe mechanism by which motor imagery normally in-
hibits its own motor output. Schwoebel et al. also suggest that CW
was unaware of proprioceptive feedback from his movements due
to the normal suppression of sensory information during motor
imagery. Evidence for such suppression exists in the visual do-
main; Craver-Lemley and Reeves, (1992) report reduced visualsensitivity during visual imagery. These ﬁndings suggest that
frontal and parietal brain areas monitor the proprioceptive con-
sequences of motor imagery, and suppress overt production of the
imagined movement.
The SMA may help the brain from confusing motor planning
and motor imagery. Grafton et al. (1996) employed positron
emission tomography (PET) imaging during observation or ima-
gery of hands grasping and suggested that activation in the SMA
and cerebellum distinguishes real movement from imagined
movement. Similarly, Grèzes and Decety (2001) report additional
activation of pre-SMA and dorsolateral frontal cortex in motor
production versus motor imagery; these areas may relate to pro-
spective memory for action planning. Motor imagery also shows
activation of ventral premotor cortex that might be explained by
verbal mediation.
The parietal lobes may also play a role in keeping motor
planning and motor imagery distinct by comparing sensory pre-
diction with the sensory feedback from motor movements. An-
other reason for the lesion patient CW's anosognosia for his ima-
gery-induced movement (discussed above) may be a confusion of
sensory prediction and actual sensory feedback caused by his bi-
lateral parietal lesions. Without being able to recognize that he
was producing or planning to produce his imagined movements,
he could not inhibit their actual production. Indeed, illusory
movements of phantom limbs may be so vivid because of a lack of
real motor feedback distinguishing the sensation of motor imagery
from the sensation of actual movement (Ramachandran and
Hirstein, 1998). In CW, actual sensory feedback from his imagery-
induced movements might be construed as motor prediction; in
phantom limb patients, predicted motor feedback might be mis-
taken for actual feedback. This suggests that predictive feedback
also plays an important role in distinguishing real movement from
motor imagery.
Little work has investigated regulation of motor imagery by
social or motivational factors. However, it is likely that the
strength of motor imagery depends upon attention and upon so-
cial–emotional factors. For example, it may be more difﬁcult to
imagine the actions of a person we dislike or disidentify with, in
the same way that we mirror them less in person (Aragón et al.,
2013).
3. The sensory system
Recent research demonstrates that sensory observation and
sensory imagery can activate the somatosensory system, some-
times even leading to a conscious sensation of touch (Fitzgibbon
et al., 2012). Sensory referral (somatosensory activation by ob-
served sensation) and sensory imagery (imagery of tactile sensa-
tion) have been explored in less detail than motor referral and
motor imagery. One reason for this may be that sensory referral
does not typically give rise to conscious qualia of touch. Another
reason is that somatosensory perception is not externally ob-
servable in the way that motor activation is (e.g. by measurement
of muscle activation). A number of studies, however, demonstrate
strong functional overlap and interaction between somatosensa-
tion and sensory simulation. We will review these studies and
then consider how the brain regulates sensory simulation, draw-
ing parallels to regulation of simulation in the motor system.
3.1. Sensory referral
3.1.1 Overlapping representations of somatosensation and observed
touch
A somatosensory analog to the mirror neuron system would
provide a mechanism for mapping observed touch onto ﬁrst-per-
son somatosensory representations (e.g., Bradshaw and
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Meyer, 2008). Indeed, cross-modal links exist between vision and
touch at early stages of sensory processing (Posner and Peterson,
1990). Sensory referral is the activation of the somatosensory
system in response to the observation of touch to another person.
Sensory referral may be unconscious, or it may give rise to a
conscious quale of touch. For example, tactile detection is faster
while viewing a congruent body part (Tipper et al., 1998; Kennet
et al., 2001; Rorden et al., 1999; Schaefer et al., 2005). This effect
has been localized by TMS to the primary somatosensory cortex
(S1) (Fiorio and Haggard, 2005), where visual input may sharpen
somatosensory receptive ﬁelds (Haggard et al., 2007). S1 is also
richly connected with the mirror-neuron rich premotor and pos-
terior parietal cortices (Driver and Spence, 2000; Rockland and
Ojima, 2003), which may mediate the crossmodal modulation of
S1 via back-projections.
Brain imaging studies corroborate the neural overlap of so-
matosensory processing and touch observation. Overlapping
adaptation in S1 has been observed during action observation and
action execution (Dinstein et al., 2007), suggesting sensory mirror
regions, and possibly sensory mirror neurons. Furthermore, vi-
carious activation of Brodmann Area 2 (BA2) to observation of
hand and mouth actions matches the somatotopy of this sensory
area (see Keysers et al., 2010), suggesting functional overlap of
observation and sensation. Primary somatosensory cortex (SI) ac-
tivity has been identiﬁed during observation of touch in some
studies (e.g. Blakemore et al., 2005; McCabe et al., 2008), though
not in others (e.g. Keysers et al., 2004); intentionality of the ob-
served touch may affect the recruitment of S1 (Ebisch et al., 2008).
BA1 and BA2 appear to track the agent of touch, while secondary
somatosensory cortex (SII) responds more to observing the re-
cipient of touch (Keysers et al., 2010; Bufalari et al., 2007). More
recently, Kaplan and Meyer (2012) used multivariate pattern
analysis to show common neural patterns across individuals dur-
ing touch observation, with stimulus-speciﬁc patterns of activity
in sensorimotor networks, and Kuehn et al. (2013) observed in-
creased posterior S1 activation during 7 T fMRI while participants
observed another person's hand receiving touch. TMS has also
recently provided causal evidence that sensory cortex is modu-
lated by observed touch (e.g. Bolognini et al., 2011).
Vicarious responses are also seen in response to observed pain.
Responses to observed pain overlap strongly with the pain matrix,
including the insula, somatosensory cortex, anterior midcingulate
cortex, periaqueductal gray, and supplementary motor area (Dec-
ety et al., 2008). Similarly, vicarious responses to emotional ex-
pressions include brain areas involved in the experience of pain
such as the insula and cingulate cortex (Bastiaansen et al., 2009).
3.1.2. Interactions between somatosensation and observed touch
The effect of sensory referral on somatosensation is strikingly
demonstrated by the rubber hand illusion (RHI). When a rubber
hand and a participant's occluded hand are spatially aligned and
stroked in synchrony, many participants begin to feel that their
own sensation is arising directly from the rubber hand (Botvinick
and Cohen, 1998). Sensory referral in the RHI displaces proprio-
ceptive judgments of limb position towards the rubber hand in
proportion to the depth of illusion experienced. Similarly, parti-
cipants react faster to touch when they watch another person (but
not object) receive anatomically congruent touch (Thomas et al.,
2006). Further, watching movies of others scratching often induces
feelings of itchiness (Papoiu et al., 2011; Holle et al., 2012), and
activates many of the brain areas associated with itch perception.
Finally, in one case report, a construction worker reported severe
pain in his right foot after jumping onto a 15 cm nail – even
though the nail passed directly between his toes without injuring
his foot (Fisher et al., 1995). Sensory referral can also interfere withtactile processing. Viewing incongruent touch to another person's
hand, for instance, interferes with spatial touch perception on
ones own hand (Maravita et al., 2002). These studies clearly de-
monstrate a somatotopic effect of sensory referral (and related
types of visual feedback) on somatosensory processing.
There is little research on the converse effect, the effect of
touch on sensory referral. However, the rubber hand illusion is
strengthened when touch to the participant and rubber hand are
spatially and temporally aligned, suggesting that congruent sen-
sation facilitates sensory referral (Tsakiris et al., 2007). In addition,
observing – but not hearing – speech increases the neural re-
sponse to touch on the lips (Möttönen et al., 2005). Mouth
movements strongly suppress this vicarious S1 response, however,
suggesting that sensorimotor feedbacks inhibit sensory referral in
SI. These ﬁndings suggest a mutual inhibition between somato-
sensation and sensory referral.
3.1.3. Processes that regulate sensory referral
What is the relationship between sensory feedback and sen-
sory referral? Interestingly, there is evidence – as in the motor
system – that amputees experience heightened sensory referral in
their phantom limb, suggesting tonic inhibition of sensory referral
by afferent sensation. When an amputee superimposes his or her
intact arm onto his or her phantom in a mirror, touching the intact
arm gives rise to referred sensation in the phantom (Ramachan-
dran et al., 1995; Ramachandran and Rogers-Ramachandran1996).
Sensations can also be referred from the experimenter's limb to
the patient's phantom; indeed, watching another person's limb
being massaged can reduce reports of pain in patients with
phantom pain (Ramachandran and Brang, 2009; Weeks and Tsao,
2010), and observing illusory touch can signiﬁcantly reduce pain
even in phantom limb patients for whommotormirror therapy has
failed (Schmalzl et al., 2013). Goller et al. (2013) reported mirror-
touch synesthesia (sensory referral) in about one third of tested
amputees; sensations were more intense when real bodies were
observed, and for observation of painful touch. This strong sensory
referral suggests that afferent sensation may normally inhibit
sensory referral. Patients with anesthesia resulting from stroke
also report increased sensory referral: touching the intact hand
refers sensation to the anesthetized hand (Sathian, 2000). In this
case, an absence of sensation from the anesthetized hand may
disinhibit transcallosal input. Similarly, patients with temporary
anesthetic blocks of the brachial plexus (for orthopedic surgery)
have been found to exhibit more sensory referral to the anesthe-
tized arm than to the non-anesthetized arm, supporting the theory
of inhibition of simulation by afferent sensation (Case et al., 2010).
Similarly, heightened mirror touch-confusion has been observed
in healthy volunteers from a topical anesthetic cream, suggesting
that sensory referral may be disinhibited rapidly when afferent
sensation is reduced (Case et al., 2013).
As in the motor system, aberrant cases of sensory referral can
reveal mechanisms of normal neural regulation of simulation.
Bradshaw and Mattingley (2001) report an anecdotal case of a
patient who had suffered head trauma affecting the parietal lobes
and subsequently exhibited strong, automatic sensory referral of
pain, as well as hyperesthesia. The patient experienced in-
stantaneous discomfort upon seeing minor injury, but only when
the injury was sudden. The patient's widow reported him saying
“don't do that (meaning to not show him suddenly); he actually
felt it” (in Bradshaw and Mattingley, correction to letter). This
hyper-referral may have resulted from decreased or delayed
frontal inhibition of the sensory mirror system, allowing un-
anticipated sensory pain referral to be experienced consciously.
Similarly, as in the motor system, transcallosal inhibition may
provide another source of modulation of sensory referral. Takasugi
et al. (2011) ﬁnd that about a quarter of participants experience
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but about 85% experience sensory referral when observing the
arm of another person in the mirror, suggesting that transcallosal
signals of ones own motor activity inhibit intrapersonal sensory
referral. Deactivation of ipsilateral SI is common in response to
unilateral touch, (Hlushchuk and Hari, 2006), so transcallosal in-
hibition of sensory referral may be affected through the same
mechanism.
If sensory neurons ﬁre when we observe touch, why do we not
actually feel touch “quale” when we observe touch? How do we
avoid confusion between our own sensation, and the sensation of
another person? de Vignemont discusses the dilemma the brain
faces in needing to simultaneously solve both the correspondence
problem (map another body and its sensations onto your own) and
the identity problem (determine to whom these mapped sensa-
tions belong). Sensorimotor feedback – unique to the self – may
afford this distinction (de Vignemont, 2014). Brodmann Area 3
(BA3) in S1 may play a role in distinguishing between direct and
vicarious somatosensation, as only mirror-touch synesthetes, who
confuse actual and vicarious touch, activated BA3 in response to
observing touch (Blakemore et al. 2005). Similarly, Schaefer et al.
(2006) report that activity in SI dynamically shifts inferiorly during
synchronous touch compared with asynchronous touch during
touch observation; this shift positively correlated with partici-
pants' reports of sensory referral. SI may thus be modulated by
brain areas involved in source attribution, or by multisensory
synchrony that contributes to inferences about body ownership.
Self-identiﬁcation may also regulate sensory referral. In touch-
confusion paradigms where a participant is touched on the face
while viewing touch to another person's face, the interference of
sensory referral (number of touch confusions) is greatest when the
model is perceived as similar to the subject (Banissy and Ward,
2013). Touch-confusion may thus result from errors in self-other
monitoring, resulting in disinhibition of the sensory mirror re-
sponse. This suggests a modulatory role of brain regions involved
in identifying the sensation as belonging “self,” such as the insula.
Activation of the posterior insula is related to strength of the RHI.
In addition, greater proprioceptive drift in the RHI (indicative of
greater illusion) correlates with reduced S1 and S2 activity but
heightened right posterior insula activation. This suggests in-
volvement of the posterior insula in perceived ownership of a
body part (Tsakiris et al., 2007). The right posterior insula has been
related to egocentric representation (Fink et al., 2003), self-re-
cognition (Devue et al., 2007), and body ownership (Baier and
Karnath, 2008). These areas parallel the role of the right inferior
parietal cortex and temporo-parietal junction in inhibiting motor
imitative response and observing oneself being imitated (Brass
and Heyes, 2005; Decety et al., 2002).
Social goals and afﬁliations also appear to regulate the simu-
lation of vicarious touch and pain. Acupuncturists, who administer
pain for therapeutic purposes, show reduced response to vicarious
pain in the anterior cingulate cortex and anterior insula (Cheng
et al., 2007), perhaps through frontal inhibitory control. In con-
trast, simulation of another's pain is enhanced for individuals of
one's ethnic in-group, suggesting a top-down inﬂuence of
knowledge of group membership (Riečanský et al., 2014). Simu-
lation of non-painful touch also appears to be regulated by a
number of social, emotional, cognitive factors (Bufalari and Ionta,
2013).
Finally, touch synesthesia may reveal aspects of normal reg-
ulation of sensory referral. Strong sensations of touch in response
to observed touch are reported in a rare form of congenital sy-
nesthesia called “mirror-touch synesthesia” (e.g. Banissy et al.,
2009). This observation is corroborated by higher rates of touch-
confusion errors in mirror-touch synesthetes than in non-sy-
nesthetes (Banissy and Ward, 2007). Mirror-touch synesthetesshow slowed reaction times when actual and observed touch are
incongruent, suggesting an interference effect of sensory referral
on sensory discrimination. However, synesthetes are not faster
than controls when these stimuli are congruent, suggesting that
the facilitation and interference effects of sensory referral may
depend upon different neural processes, such as a failure to re-
cognize a recipient of touch as being not-self. Blakemore et al.
(2005) found higher activation in a synesthete than in non-sy-
nesthetes during observation of touch in SI, SII, left premotor
cortex, and anterior insula. Watching touch to others also caused
changes in mental representations of self in mirror-touch sy-
nesthetes, supporting the theory that differences in mapping of
sensation as “self” or “other” may determine whether sensation is
experienced consciously (Maister et al., 2013, Banissy and Ward,
2013). Indeed, synesthetic touch is strongest for touch to real
bodies and weaker for dummy bodies or pictures of bodies (Holle
et al., 2011). Mirror-touch synesthesia may constitute an extreme
version of normal sensory referral that has exceeded (or cir-
cumvented) the threshold for consciousness (Fitzgibbon et al.,
2012). Indeed, there are reports that hyperactivity in somatosen-
sory mirror areas induced by pain or trauma, or experimentally by
transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), may heighten re-
sponse to observed touch and pain (Fitzgibbon et al., 2010; Bo-
lognini et al., 2013).
3.2. Sensory imagery
3.2.1 Overlapping representations of somatosensation and sensory
imagery
Sensory imagery – the imagining of sensation – is difﬁcult to
study because few measures other than self-report have been
developed to determine whether a person literally feels an ima-
gined sensory stimulus. The unclear boundary between sensory
imagery and sensory referral further complicates matters. Armel
and Ramachandran (2003) demonstrated sensory referral from a
table to participants' hands (via synchronous stroking, as in the
RHI); the referral was strengthened if the subject simultaneously
engaged in imagery, imagining that the table was their hand. It is
unclear whether the sensory referral resulted from visual input, or
from imagery biasing the interpretation of the visual input. Simi-
larly, a PET study conducted by Rauch et al. (1995) to examine the
neural basis of phobic symptoms found a signiﬁcant somatosen-
sory activation, even though the provocative stimuli were purely
visual (e.g. a live spider in a jar). The authors suggest that the vi-
sual stimuli may have induced vivid tactile imagery, as all parti-
cipants reported both tactile and visual imagery.
Despite these challenges, several studies provide insight into
the brain correlates of sensory imagery. Primary and secondary
somatosensory areas are often recruited during tactile imagery,
and partially overlap with the areas that respond to touch. Using
fMRI, Yoo et al. (2003) found that tactile imagery for the hand
engaged contralateral S1 and S2, left parietal lobe, left inferior
frontal gyri, left dorsolateral prefrontal area, left precentral gyrus,
left insula, medial frontal gyrus, left thalamus, and the putamen.
Tactile expectation may also be considered a type of imagery, as it
involves a sensory stimulation of the expected touch that often
invokes imagery. Studies of tactile expectation thus provide some
insight into imagery. Anticipation of tickling generates brain acti-
vation similar to that of actual tickling, including activation of the
contralateral primary sensory cortex, bilateral areas in the inferior
parietal lobules, SII, right anterior cingulate cortex, and areas in
the right prefrontal cortex (Carlsson et al., 2000). In addition,
prediction of a sensory stimulus in the near future improves the
speed and accuracy of sensory response (Posner and Peterson,
1990) and modulates activity in SI (Van Ede et al., 2010; Langner
et al., 2011). Langner et al. (2011) suggest that top-down
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sensory cortices by modifying baseline levels of activity.
Sensory imagery can also cause physiological response. For
example, orgasm from mental imagery alone can produce in-
creases heart rate, systolic blood pressure, pupil diameter, pain
detection threshold, and pain tolerance threshold comparable to
those produced by self-stimulation (Whipple et al., 1992). Sensory
imagery can also affect body temperature. Kojo (1985) asked
participants to imagine holding their hand in hot or cold water,
and found that participants' skin temperature changed sig-
niﬁcantly in the congruent direction during trials that the subject
reported successful imagery. Maslach et al. (1972) controlled for
the possibility that this association was correlational rather than
causal by asking subjects to simultaneously change their skin
temperature on both hands, in opposite directions. Participants
who had hypnosis training were able to achieve this. Interestingly,
all participants believed they had successfully created bilateral
temperature differences. This suggests that temperature imagery
may have changed temperature perception, without changing
actual skin temperature. Sensory imagery has also been shown to
modulate pain. For example, Johnson et al. (1998) found that
imagery of neutral or pleasant events increased pain thresholds,
and Van Tilburg et al. (2009) obtained long-term sustained pain
reduction in children with functional abdominal pain through
guided imagery.
3.2.2. Interactions between somatosensation and sensory imagery
Sensation affects sensory imagery. For example, Atance and
Meltzoff (2006) studied how three to ﬁve-year-old children's
preferences for future pretzel-eating were inﬂuenced by their
current level of thirst (manipulated by feeding them pretzels).
Despite children's overwhelming desire for pretzels in the baseline
condition, thirsty children chose water for their current snack –
but also when asked about a snack planned “for tomorrow.” The
children's thirst sensation interfered with accurate sensory simu-
lation of their future sensory states. This interference did not de-
pend on children's age, and all understood “tomorrow,” suggesting
that the failure was not directly dependent on theory of mind or
executive control abilities that are actively developing in this age
range. In fact, similar ﬁndings have been obtained in adults; Nis-
bett and Kanouse (1969) and Gilbert et al. (2002) both found that
hungry shoppers purchase more food than those who are not
hungry. If truly divorced from frontal lobe inhibition, develop-
mental differences in simulating the future might reﬂect gradual
development of the mutual inhibition between sensory perception
and sensory simulation that help separate reality from imagina-
tion. This is supported by the fact that children have more difﬁ-
culty with source monitoring and are more likely than adults to
confuse imagined actions with their own real actions (Foley and
Johnson, 1985).
Sensory imagery also affects sensation. Perky (1910) reported
that when participants were asked to describe common objects
while dim projections of the objects were surreptitiously pre-
sented, participants reported perceiving only mental imagery:
they remained unaware of the real visual stimulus being shown.
Similarly, Segal and Fusella (1970) found reduced sensitivity to
auditory and visual stimuli while subjects imagined pictures and
sounds; intramodal imagery interfered more than intermodal
imagery. Unfortunately, few comparable data are available in the
somatosensory domain. Facilitation of sensory perception through
imagery is complicated to assess, as a stronger tactile percept is
not necessarily a more accurate percept, and vice versa. However,
there is some evidence that imagery can affect sensation. Talking
about an itch, for example, tends to make a listener feel itchy and
scratch more (Niemeier and Gieler, 2000). Similarly, the contagion
of physical distress through seeing, hearing, or reading aboutanother person suffering is surprisingly common (Morse and
Mitcham, 1997). Pleasant sensations can also be enhanced through
imagery. For example, the pleasantness of caress and corre-
sponding touch-evoked activation in S1 are enhanced when the
apparent (implied) gender and attractiveness or the caresser is
manipulated (Gazzola et al., 2012). Thinking about touch can also
selectively facilitate response time to tactile stimuli (Anema et al.,
2012).
3.2.3. Processes that regulate sensory imagery
There is little research on the effect of deafferentation on
sensory imagery. However, Hugdahl et al. (2001) have demon-
strated activation of sensory cortex and sub-cortical pain pathways
when an upper limb amputee imagined moving his ﬁngers in a
way that would cause pain, suggesting that sensory imagery is not
abolished by the removal of sensory feedback. It is not clear
whether or not sensory imagery might be enhanced by
deafferentation.
The prefrontal cortex may play an important role in modulation
of sensory imagery. The prefrontal cortex supports task perfor-
mance by exciting task-relevant information processing and in-
hibiting irrelevant information (Knight et al., 1999); patients with
damage to prefrontal areas have difﬁculty inhibiting task-irrele-
vant information. Interestingly, these patients also exhibit en-
hanced primary somatosensory cortical responses to distracting
sensory information, suggesting that prefrontal damage disrupts
sensory inhibition or sensory gating. Similarly, Yamaguchi et al.
(2006) report heightened somatosensory evoked potentials (SEP)
in a patient with frontal alien hand behavior following medial
frontal lobe damage; the frontal lobe damage likely disinhibited
the patient's somatosensory response.
Hypnosis is another phenomenon that implicates the frontal
lobes in regulation of sensory imagery. Hypnotic suggestions can
generate strong sensory imagery that blurs the line between per-
ception and reality (e.g. Schweiger and Parducci, 1981; Santar-
cangelo et al., 2005). Hypnosis may decrease frontal cognitive
control (e.g. Wagstaff et al. 2007) and disinhibit sensory areas,
making participants more susceptible to suggestion – or it may
decrease activation of areas like the medial frontal lobe that are
implicated in distinguishing real and imagined perceptual events
(Ku et al., 2008). Some studies have found a positive correlation
between hypnotizability and imagery ability (e.g. Hargadon et al.,
1995; Paoletti et al., 2010), while others have not (e.g. Kogon et al.,
1998). Further, highly hypnotizable subjects have achieved stron-
ger tactile imagery than other subjects (Carli et al., 2007), and
individual differences in hypnotizability are linked with efﬁciency
of the attentional system in the frontal lobes (Egnera et al., 2005).
Finally, hypnosis increases pain-related brain activity generated by
imagery of pain (Derbyshire et al., 2004). Activation of the right
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, insula, and anterior cingulated
cortex predicted pain-related activation in the secondary soma-
tosensory cortex (SII) (Raij et al., 2009). These studies suggest that
hypnosis may strengthen sensory imagery by decreasing in-
hibitory control from the frontal lobes.
Tactile hallucinations provide another window into the normal
regulation of sensory imagery. One type of chronic tactile hallu-
cination is known as Dermatozoenwahn- a feeling of bugs
swarming crawling, and jumping on the skin. SPECT imaging of
patients with Dermatozoenwahn during active tactile hallucination
showed decreased frontal activity and inferior temporal activity,
coupled with increased activity in the anterior basal ganglia
(Musalek et al., 1989). Musalek et al. relate their ﬁnding to Jack-
son's (1932) hypothesis that hallucination results from decreased
inhibition of basal structures by upper cortical structures. Other
studies merely show activation of sensory regions. Shergill et al.
(2001) studied a single patient with fMRI and found that the
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tosensory cortex, posterior parietal cortex, and the thalamus. Ne-
moto et al. (2010) studied ﬁve patients with delusional disorders
during somatic hallucination and found hyperperfusion of left
somatosensory cortex and right paracentral cortex.
What happens to somatic hallucinations when sensory pro-
cessing regions are damaged? Braun et al. (2003) reviewed studies
of single-modality hallucination after focal brain lesions and re-
ported strong concordance between lesion area and sensory
modality of hallucination; they suggest that hallucinations after
focal brain damage are caused by compensatory over-activation of
neural tissue proximal to the injury. Loss of sensory brain tissue
may release inhibition of sensory cortex and cause spontaneous
activity resulting in hallucination, despite patients' awareness of
the illusory nature of the hallucination. Perhaps the normal
function of the frontal lobes in these patients may underlie their
continued ability to discriminate hallucination from reality.4. Summary
Research on common coding in the human mirror neuron
system has turned up strong evidence for overlapping neural re-
presentations of motor production, motor imagery, and action
perception. We review interactions between these mingled pro-
cesses and explore how these interactions are regulated. We also
extend this logic to the somatosensory domain and the putative
somatosensory mirror system. We suggest that there is also evi-
dence for mutual interaction between somatosensation, observed
touch (sensory referral), and sensory imagery. Most frequently,
touch enhances sensory referral and imagery if it is similar (as in
the rubber hand illusion; e.g. Tsakiris et al., 2007), and detracts
from the simulation if it is dissimilar (as in the interference of
thirst on simulation of desire for food; Atance and Meltzoff, 2006).
Conversely, sensory simulations inﬂuence the perception of touch.
Observing insects can induce sensations of itch (e.g. Rauch et al.,
1995), and observing touch can interfere with perception of dis-
similar touch on ones own skin (e.g. Maravita et al., 2002).
Overlapping representation of perception and action implies
that the processing of actual, imagined, and referred movements
and sensation must compete for control of behavior, physiological
response, and conscious representation. These interactions must
therefore be carefully regulated in order to maintain a grasp on
reality. Counterintuitively, we suggest that deafferentation often
increases visual referral of movement or sensation – most likely
due to a push-pull system of activation–deactivation. This suggests
that sensorimotor feedback normally inhibits simulation. Remov-
ing this feedback may also remove interference effects caused by
dissimilar movements and sensations. In addition, evidence from
imaging studies and patient reports suggests that frontal, parietal,
and transcallosal inputs ﬂexibly suppress simulations that inter-
fere with current sensorimotor goals, while inferior parietal and
superior temporal areas may inﬂuence the strength of sensor-
imotor simulation in accordance with social or self-identiﬁcation
with a goal or with an actor. When areas involved in regulation are
damaged, or when sensorimotor activity is removed, simulation
may paradoxically be disinhibited and strengthened. More re-
search is needed to fully evaluate these effects.
A number of studies now suggest that sensorimotor imagery
and perception affect our sensation, actions, and physiology. Pﬁs-
ter et al. (2012) describe this effect in terms of competition be-
tween endogenous and exogenous actions for control of our per-
ception and behavior. Endogenous actions are internally gener-
ated, while exogenous actions are quick, environmentally driven
responses to external cues. While imagery and action observation
are not solely exogenous, they present a similar problem: withoutproper control, they may lead to behaviors inappropriately linked
to present goals or circumstance, as in the case of unrestrained
imitation, or unanchored to their source, as in the case of hallu-
cination. The inﬂuence of simulation must be moderated by our
needs, preferences, and limitations.5. Future directions
Many questions remained unanswered about the inﬂuence and
regulation of sensorimotor simulation. First, most researchers have
considered sensorimotor imagery or observation in isolation. Gi-
ven their neural overlap, it is likely that they interact with one
another. This raises questions about how simulations are prior-
itized versus suppressed, and the extent to which these processes
are under voluntary control. Sensory and motor referral are by
deﬁnition automatic processes, yet they are strongly inﬂuenced by
an agent's conscious goals. Voluntary motor imagery practice, for
example, enhances motor ability (e.g. Dicksten and Deutsch,
2007), and voluntary imagery enhances sensory referral (e.g. Ar-
mel and Ramachandran, 2003). More investigation is needed to
examine the roles of volitional attention and top-down executive
control in inﬂuencing the fate of sensorimotor simulations. In
addition, many questions remain about the mechanism of inter-
action between various sensorimotor processes. The mutual in-
ﬂuence of simulation and “real” movement or sensation on one
other does not distinguish whether their interaction arises from
activation of identical neurons or through excitatory and in-
hibitory connections between neighboring neural representations.
Because almost all work on the mirror neuron system in humans is
conducted through behavioral and neuroimaging experiments that
interrogate populations of neurons, it is difﬁcult to say whether
mirror neurons themselves – or mirror mechanisms – subserve
the interactions described in this review.
Future research is also needed to understand the regulation of
sensorimotor simulation across development and in health and
disease. Understanding interactions between simulation and “real”
sensorimotor activity may provide greater insight into develop-
ment of empathy and cognitive control. This balance may also
underlie individual differences in imagery ability, ability to learn
by imitation, and the ability to plan for counterfactual circum-
stances. Further, understanding the impact of brain lesions and
disease on sensorimotor simulation may lead to new insights in
sensorimotor rehabilitation. Motor imagery and observation are
helpful for rehabilitation in a wide range of conditions, and further
knowledge about the regulation of simulation may help to opti-
mize their rehabilitative effects as well as improve motor learning
in healthy individuals. Finally, more research is needed to de-
termine how somatosensory simulation is regulated and harness
this information to understand and treat conditions involving
abnormal sensation or pain. For instance, methods to temporarily
reduce inhibitory cognitive control, such as hypnosis, may enhance
the therapeutic effect that sensory imagery has on pain (e.g.
Johnson et al., 1998; Van Tilburg et al., 2009), and therapies
combining imagery and referral might be more successful than
either alone in achieving speciﬁc sensorimotor goals. The inﬂuence
of social identiﬁcation on strength of simulation might also be
harnessed in novel ways to increase sensorimotor goals through
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